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channels with distinct geographic scopes. Empirical results based on data from China document that 
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1. Introduction 
Firms tend to agglomerate in specific areas so as to reduce transaction cost and exploit external 
economies. Such external economies are commonly known as Marshallian externalities of which 
the central idea highlights that the concentration of production in a particular location generates 
external benefits for firms in that location through knowledge spillovers, labor pooling, and close 
proximity of specialized suppliers (Marshall, 1920).
1
 The foreign direct investment (FDI) location 
literature has documented similar self-perpetuating growth or agglomeration pattern of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in space and over time (see, among others, Head et al., 1995; 
Cheng and Kwan, 2000a, 2000b; Blonigen et al., 2005; Lin and Kwan, 2011). The externalities 
arising from FDI penetration also have long received great attentions from both economists and 
policy makers. Although the previous literature has provided some evidence of FDI spillovers at 
both firm and industry levels (Lin et al., 2009; Abraham et al., 2010; Hale and Long, 2011; Xu and 
Sheng, 2012; Damijan et al., 2013; Merlevede et al., 2014; among other earlier contributions), little 
is known about the extent to which the regional presence of FDI affects the aggregate productivity 
of local private firms in spatial dimension. This paper studies FDI spatial spillovers using county-
level data supplemented with precise GPS information of China. More specifically, this paper asks: 
Do domestic private firms benefit from FDI presence in their local and neighbouring regions? How 
to identify and quantify the geographic extent of FDI spillovers? Do FDI spillovers attenuate with 
distance? If so, how rapid is the geographic attenuation pattern?  
 
There exists a vast literature on FDI spillovers. FDI presence may benefit domestic firms via 
channels like labor turnover, demonstration of new technology, competition effect, reverse 
engineering, and ‘learning by watching’ (see, among others, MacDougall, 1960; Kokko, 1994; 
Blalock and Gerlter, 2008). FDI spillovers from MNCs to domestic firms can also be negative. A 
leading example in the literature is ‘market stealing effect’ (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).2 While the 
penetration of MNCs may bestow positive externalities on domestic firms, it could also generate, at 
the same time, a negative demand effect, which drags down the productivity of local firms. Another 
possible source of negative impact comes from foreign firms poaching local talents from domestic 
firms to the detriment of domestic firms’ productivity (Blalock and Gerlter, 2008). The net impact 
                                                        
1
 Marshall (1920) argues that firms can benefit from two types of external economies: 1) economies arising from ‘the 
use of specialized skill and machinery’ which depend on ‘the aggregate volume of production in the neighborhood’ 
and 2) economies “connected with the growth of knowledge and the progress of the arts” which tie to the ‘aggregate 
volume of production in the whole civilized world’.  
2
 Aitken and Harrison(1999) argues that, in the short run, indigenous firms may be constrained by high fixed cost that 
prevents them from reducing their total cost; therefore, foreign firms with cost advantages due to better technology 
can steal market share from domestic firms via price competition. As a result, due to a lack of economies of scale, the 
shrinking demand will push up the unit cost of domestic firms and decrease their operation efficiency. 
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from FDI presence on domestic firms hence depends on the magnitude of these two opposite 
externalities.  
 
Though the theoretical arguments are well established, the empirical literature so far provides 
mixed evidence of the existence, the sign, and the magnitude of FDI spillovers. This is partially due 
to the fact that the above mentioned channels are operative at the same time even though their 
impacts may have different scopes and they reach local firms in different manners. Empirical 
exercises focusing on simple association between domestic firms’ productivity and FDI presence 
can at best summarize an averaged impact resulting from various channels and  dimensions, but it 
can barely reveal the underlying mechanism of FDI spillovers. Focusing predominantly on this 
averaged impact will likely dilute the genuine and rich variations of FDI spillovers and result in 
misleading conclusion. Identification problem thus remains a challenging but vital issue in the FDI 
spillovers literature. 
 
In this paper, we use geography to identify and quantify FDI spillovers. Geographical distance 
determines the costs and the attenuation pattern of technology diffusion, which may reduce the 
likelihood for indigenous firms that are distant from MNCs to expropriate spillovers. The fact that 
spatial interactions are shaped by feedback loops (i.e., from one location to its neighbors, and then 
neighbors’ neighbors, and finally back to the original location indirectly) further complicates the 
identification issue and the interpretation of resulting estimates. Our method described in section 3 
is capable of quantifying separately the direct and indirect impacts, as well as producing a set of 
partitioning summary measures to describe the rate of decay pattern across space and over time. 
Further, we exploit the fact that different spillover channels should have different geographic 
scopes to identify spillovers from different sources. For instance, it is reasonable to expect positive 
knowledge spillovers should have a wider geographic scope than negative poaching effect, though 
both are intermediated via the labor turnover channel. In view of the rapid development in modern 
information technology, the diffusion barrier and communication cost for knowledge spillovers 
have been significantly reduced. Labor mobility across regions, however, is still subject to high 
reallocation expenses that increase with distance. It is thus more difficult for MNCs to poach talents 
from distant domestic firms, implying that poaching effect should decay relatively faster. 
Consequently, knowledge spillovers can be identified with wider geographic scope, whereas 
poaching effect can be identified with more local scope. Negative market stealing effect, on the 
other hand, should have no boundary as its impact could easily spread out to the whole country 
through integrated markets. Given the increasingly diverse and convenient distribution channels for 
products, sales network nowadays is hard to be segmented. Market stealing impact hence should 
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appear not just locally but also in wide geographic scope. Our empirical findings confirm the above 
conjectures. Negative poaching effect in our estimations appears only in local scope while positive 
knowledge spillovers become dominant in wider geographic scope. Negative market stealing effect, 
however, is always quantitatively significant regardless of geographic scope. 
 
We employ two proxies to capture FDI spillovers in this paper. Many recent studies emphasize the 
role of labor market pooling in the process of spatial knowledge spillovers. Fallick et al. (2006) and 
Freedman (2008) illustrate that industry co-agglomeration facilitates labor mobility (moving among 
jobs). Ellison et al. (2010) further document that industries employing the same types of workers 
tend to co-agglomerate. Duranton and Puga (2004) explore the micro-foundations based on spatial 
externalities arising from sharing, matching and learning among individuals. Kloosterman (2008) 
and Ibrahim et al. (2009) both argue that industry agglomeration promotes knowledge spillovers 
since it facilitates individuals to share ideas and tacit knowledge. In line with these studies, we 
adopt regional employment share of foreign firms as one of the proxies for FDI spatial spillovers to 
capture spillovers from labor market pooling. To capture the potential pecuniary externalities 
suggested by Aitken and Harrison (1999) (such as market stealing or crowding out of local firms) 
we also use regional sales income share of foreign firms as the second proxy.  
 
There are other papers studying the spatial impact of FDI using geographical information. Using 
aggregate data at the city level, Madriaga and Poncet (2007) show that the economic growth of 
Chinese cities benefit not only from their own FDI inflows but also from FDI flows to the 
neighboring cities. Monastiriotis and Jordaan (2010) and Tanaka and Hashiguchi (2015) both 
document that FDI presence generates significant productivity spillovers at both local and regional 
levels. This paper contributes to the literature in the following aspects: (a) We provide county-level 
evidence of FDI spatial spillovers in China, taking into account spillovers through spatial feedback 
loops, thereby allowing separate identification of intra- and inter-regional spillover effect; (b) In 
view of the fact that spillover effect gradually spreads over time and across space, we capture the 
diffusion dynamics by means of a spatiotemporal dynamic panel data model which, to the best of 
our knowledge, has not been applied before in the FDI spillover literature; (c) We exploit 
geographical information to disentangle various spillover effects emanating from different sources 
and quantify their impact and scope of influence.   
 
The regional presence of FDI is largely driven by the related policy in China. With an aim of 
facilitating local firms to learn from nearby MNCs, five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were set 
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up in the early 1980s to attract foreign capital by exempting MNCs from taxes and regulations.
3 
These five special economic zones are Shenzhen, Xiamen, Hainan, Zhuhai, and Shantou, which are 
all located in coastal areas. In view of the early success of this experiment, similar schemes, such as 
Open Coastal Cities (OCCs), Open Coastal Areas, Economic and Technological Development 
Zones (ETDZs) and Hi-Tech Parks, were set up subsequently to cover broader and inner regions in 
the later years.
4
 Figure 1 compares the FDI spatial density distribution (measured as fixed asset 
share of FDI in a specific county) between 1998 and 2007. As shown in the graphs, FDI presence in 
1998 mainly clusters in coastal and some central regions of China. The graph for 2007 indicates that 
the clustering pattern has been getting stronger over time. While the majority of clusters remain in 
coastal and central regions, FDI presence has been directed and spread to broader and inner areas in 
China. In view of the fact that similar place-based FDI policy has been widely implemented in the 
rest of the world, our empirical results also generate important implications on the experiment of 
policy-driven clustering among indigenous firms and MNEs in developing countries. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents the results 
of exploratory spatial data analyses. Section 3 presents a spatiotemporal dynamic panel model that 
incorporates the spatial features observed in section 2. Section 4 discusses various econometric 
issues and presents empirical results. The final section concludes with a summary and suggestions 
for future research.  
 
2. Data and Exploratory Data Analysis 
2.1 Data 
Data employed in this paper come from the annual census of above-size manufacturing firms of 
China from 1998 to 2007. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China conducts the census. 
The database (known as the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, NBS-CIE database 
henceforth) reports census data for Chinese manufacturing firms with annual sales revenue over 5 
million RMB. There are several variables (including the Chinese standard location indicator, 
province code, city code, county code, district code, as well as firms’ full address) can help us 
identify the location of a firm. Of all these variables, province code, city code and county code are 
most complete and consistent over the years. Information specifying the distance between 
                                                        
3
 Commonly known as the strategy of ‘swapping market access for technology’. 
4
 See Cheng (1994) for a detailed review of the evolution of FDI policy in China. 
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individual firms is not available. We hence define ‘region’ as a county in this paper. Consequently, 
all variables in this paper are aggregate county-level data constructed from firm-level information. 
This results in an unbalanced panel data set with 1357 counties in 1998 and 2023 counties in 2007, 
respectively. The longitude and latitude information of the counties are  obtained from the GADM 
database of Global Administrative Areas.
5
 
 
Domestic private firms in this paper are defined as firms that have not received equity capital from 
foreign investors or from any level of China’s government.6 Appendix A reports the information of 
firms’ ownership structures and their proportions in each year in the database. More specifically, in 
this paper, domestic private firms are firms with ownership structures from column (1) to column 
(7) in the table. FDI firms correspond to columns of ‘Foreign Firms’ and ‘Sino-Foreign Joint 
Ventures’. 
 
The first step of our data analysis is to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) at firm level and then 
aggregate them up to the county level. In Appendices B and C, we describe in details our data 
cleaning process and the procedure of constructing county-level TFP from firm-level data. 
 
2.2 Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
There are strong theoretical reasons why regional total factor productivities (TFPs) might be 
spatially correlated. Ciccone and Hall (1996) prove theoretically that the density of economic 
activity would affect productivity in spatial dimension through externalities and increasing returns. 
They also provide empirical evidence showing that more than half of the variance of productivity 
across U.S. states can be attributed to the differences in the spatial density of economic activity. In 
this section we present empirical evidence that county level TFP of domestic private firms in China 
also exhibits very strong spatial autocorrelation.  
 
By definition spatial autocorrelation describes the coincidence of value similarity with locational 
similarity (Anselin, 2001). Positive spatial autocorrelation means high (or low) values of a variable 
tend to cluster together in space, and negative spatial autocorrelation indicates high (low) values are 
surrounded by low (high) values. As standard measures, both global and local Moran’s I statistics 
are commonly adopted in the literature to measure the strength and significance of spatial 
                                                        
5 
GADM is a spatial database of the location of the world’s administrative areas (or administrative boundaries). The 
database describes where these administrative areas are (the spatial features), and for each area it provides some 
attributes, such as the name, geography area, longitude and latitude, and shape. Source: http://www.diva-gis.org/. 
6
 This study does not attempt to address and evaluate the impact of FDI on the productivity of China’s state-owned 
enterprises. This issue may be investigated in future research. 
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autocorrelation. Global Moran’s I statistic is defined as 
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where itx  is the variable of interest (TFP) for county i at time t; t  is the mean of variable x  in year 
t; 
ijw  is a spatial weight that depicts the relative similarity of two localities (counties i  and j ) in 
space. n  is the number of counties. 0S  is a scalar factor equal to the sum of all ijw . In this paper, 
we define the spatial weight as inversed geographical distance between two localities, i.e.,   
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where 
ijd  denotes the geographical distance between counties i  and j . Similarly, local Moran’s I 
statistic is defined as 
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Local Moran’s I is an example of Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) defined in Anselin 
(1995).  
 
By comparing equations (1) and (3), it can be shown that, for a row standardized weights matrix, 
the global Moran’s I equals the mean of the local Moran’s I statistics up to a scaling constant. 
Consequently, while local Moran’s I statistics describe the extent of significant spatial clustering of 
similar values around each particular locality (county i ), global Moran’s I yields one statistic to 
summarize these local information across the whole study area. For both global and local Moran’s I, 
a positive value for I statistic indicates that a county has neighboring counties with similarly high or 
low attribute values (TFP), i.e., this county is part of a cluster. A negative value for I statistic 
indicates that a county has neighboring counties with dissimilar values, i.e., this county is an outlier.  
 
Table 1 reports the global Moran’s I statistics for aggregate county level TFP for domestic private 
firms. As shown in the table, Moran’s I statistics are significant and positive in all cases, indicating 
positive spatial autocorrelation for TFP. Notice that the magnitude of the statistics increases 
significantly over time, indicating an escalating pattern of spatial clustering in terms of TFP 
innovation for domestic private firms during the sample period. This observation motives us to 
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explicitly incorporate both space and time autocorrelations in the econometric model described in 
section 3. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Equation (1) essentially describes the correlation between spatially weighted (spatial lag) variable, 
Wz , and z  itself, where z  is the variable of interest (TFP) that has been standardized. 
Consequently, Moran’s I statistic can also be illustrated by plotting Wz  against z  while the statistic 
is equivalent to the slope of the linear regression of Wz  on z . Figure 2 presents these Moran 
scatterplots for county-level TFP.
7
 Since variables are standardized, plots over time are comparable. 
It is clear that, over time, there is a tendency that more observations are located in the upper-right 
quadrant, corresponding to high-high values. The data shows clearly that domestic private firms’ 
TFP is becoming more clustered over the sample period.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 3 presents a comparison of local Moran statistic for TFP of domestic private firms between 
1998 and 2007. To highlight the key areas of clustering, only counties with significant (at 5% level) 
local Moran statistics are plotted. The color code on the map indicates the corresponding quadrant 
in the Moran scatterplots (Figure 2) to which the counties belong. The graphs show significant 
change of clustering location during the sample period. In 1998, there are only several clusters 
covering limited regions.
8
 In 2007, however, high-high clusters spread to almost the entire central 
and central-northern parts of China and the province of Yunnan, while the high-low outliers and 
low-low clusters spread to most of the southern coastal regions of China. It is apparent that, for TFP 
level of domestic private firms, over time, the location of clusters has spread out to broader area and 
the spatial clustering pattern (both high-high and low-low clusterings) has become more prominent 
over the decade of the sample. An interesting observation is that, when comparing Figure 1 and 3, it 
seems that areas with high-high clustering of domestic private firms’s TFP are also areas with low 
FDI density, while areas with low-low clustering are areas with high FDI density.  
 
                                                        
7
 In each graph, the four quadrants in the plot group the observations into four types of spatial interaction: namely, high 
values located next to high values (high-high cluster in upper right-hand corner), low values located next to low 
values (low-low cluster in lower left-hand corner), high values located next to low values (high-low outlier in lower 
right-hand corner), and low values located next to high values (low-high outlier in upper left-hand corner). 
8
 The high-high clusters are mainly in 1) the province of Yunnan; 2) around Beijing and the provinces of Shanxi and 
Hebei; and 3) some areas in Inner Mongolia. There are also high-low outliers or low-low clusters in 1) provinces of 
Guangxi and Guangdong and 2) provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin. 
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[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
To sum up, exploratory spatial data analysis reveals salient spatial autocorrelation feature for 
county-level TFP of domestic private firms. There is a strong tendency that TFPs are getting more 
clustered throughout the sample period. In the next section, we further explore these observations in 
a spatiotemporal model that incorporates both spatial interactions across regions and spatial 
technology diffusion of FDI. 
 
3. The Empirical Model 
To estimate the extent of FDI spillovers and its diffusion pattern over time and across space, we 
generalize the spatiotemporal partial adjustment model in LeSage and Pace (2009, Chapter 7) to 
come up with the spatiotemporal dynamic panel regression in (4) as the platform for our empirical 
analysis, where the spatial weights 
ijw  are inversely proportional to the geographical distance ijd  
between two regions i and j as stated in (5)
9
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The dependent variable itTFP  in (4) is county-level TFP described in Appendix C. We include two 
explanatory variables as proxies for FDI penetration, namely, the employment share and the sales 
income share of foreign firms in a county:  
                              
_     and    
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9
 Summary statistics of variables in Eq. (4) are reported in Appendix D. 
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where superscript T  refers to all firms (both domestic and foreign) in a county, and superscript FDI 
refers to foreign firms only. The two proxies are expected to identify different channels of FDI 
spillovers. FDI employment share is expected to capture spillover effect that diffuses through the 
labor market channel (e.g. positive spillovers such as technology transfers, learning-by-watching, 
and knowledge spillovers via labor turnovers; negative spillovers such as poaching local talents 
from domestic firms). In contrast, sales income share is expected to capture the pecuniary 
externalities such as market stealing and crowding out of local firms. In view of the prominence of 
the state-owned sector in China and its well documented impact on the private sector, we also 
include the fixed-asset share of state-owned enterprises in a county as a third explanatory variable: 
          
SOE
it
Tit
it
Fixed  Assets
SOE_presence
Fixed  Assets
   (7)   
where superscripts T  and SOE refer to all firms and state-owned firms respectively.
10
 Finally, our 
panel data structure allows us to include two fixed effects that control for the impact of unmeasured 
nationwide events and local heterogeneity. Time-specific fixed effect t  captures macroeconomic 
or policy events that have nationwide impact on productivity; and region-specific fixed effect i  
captures unmeasured local characteristics (such as absorptive capacity, human capital, and 
geography) that exert heterogeneous impact on productivity.
11
  
 
With spatial interactions and temporal adjustments explicitly incorporated by the two autoregressive 
terms, 
11
N
ij jtj
w TFP   
and 
1itTFP  , equation (4) implies that a change in a single observation 
associated with any explanatory variable, located in region i as of time t, will generate direct impact 
on the region itself (i.e. intra-regional impact /it s itTFP x  ) and potentially indirect impact on 
other region j (i.e. inter-regional impact /jt s itTFP x  ), starting from time t and extending all the 
way to indefinite future. These multipliers include the effect of spatial feedback loops. For instance, 
a first order feedback effect means a change of observation itx  in region i affects jtTFP  in region j 
(region i’s immediate neighbor), which in turn affects itTFP  in region i via the spatial 
autoregressive term. These feedback loops arise because region i is considered as a neighbor to its 
neighbors, so that impacts passing through neighboring regions will create a feedback impact on 
                                                        
10
 The impact of SOEs on private section is discussed in Huang (1998), Bai et al. (2000), Bai et al. (2004), and Huang 
et al. (2008). SOEs might generate crowding out effect, as well as creating distortions in both input and output 
markets (especially in the financial market), which all have significant impact on private firms. 
11 Recent literature (e.g. Damijan et al. 2013) emphasizes the role of firm heterogeneity (e.g. size, absorptive capacity, 
technology, etc) in explaining the impact of FDI. We therefore expect county heterogeneity will also be important in 
the current context.   
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region i itself. The path of these feedback loops can be extended with the order of neighbors getting 
higher. Consequently, by incorporating these two autoregressive terms, our model is capable of 
accounting for spillovers among domestic firms resulting from Marshallian agglomeration in space.   
 
Often interest centers on the accumulated multiplier matrix ( )kS W  whose ( , )i j  element is the 
accumulated impact jt s its t TFP x


  . Averaging over the n regions gives the following summary 
measures of spatial impacts introduced by LeSage and Pace (2009):  
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 Average Total Indirect Impact ATI ATDI    (10) 
 
where tr is the trace operator and ι is a column of ones. By rewriting (4) as a distributed lag model 
and then differentiate, it can be shown that the spatial accumulated multiplier matrix follows the 
formula    
   (11) 
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  (12) 
It is of interest to examine the spatial diffusion profile of the multiplier effect imbedded in the 
power series expansion in (11). The profile reveals the extent to which the impact of explanatory 
variable k spreads from lower-order neighbors to higher-order neighbors across space. The speed of 
diffusion is parsimoniously parameterized by *  which in turn is determined by the time and 
spatial autoregressive parameters   and  .  
 
To sum up, by adopting a spatiotemporal framework, our empirical model explicitly accounts for a) 
spillovers from FDI and among domestic firms, and b) spillovers through spatial feedback loops 
across space and over time via the spatiotemporal autoregressive terms. The squared bracket terms 
in the third line of (11) represent spatially partitioned effects, where powers of W in the squared 
brackets in the second line capture the weights associated with the observations themselves (zero-
  
11 
order impacts with 0W ), immediate neighbors (first-order impacts with 1W ), neighbors of 
neighbors (second-order impacts with 2W ), and so on. These spatially partitioned summary 
measures are the results of complex FDI spillovers being disentangled into narrow and wide 
geographic scopes, which in turn can be used to identify and quantify spillovers from different 
channels. It is also due to these complications, the focus of this paper will be on how to generate 
and interpret these spatially partitioned effects base on the estimated model. To be more specific, 
equation (4) is estimated to obtain consistent parameter estimates as an initial step. We then apply 
simulation-oriented Bayesian approach to generate posterior distribution of the objects of interest. 
More details are described in the following section. 
 
4. Estimation Issues and Empirical Results 
4.1 Estimation Issues 
As the first step of our empirical analysis, system-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998) is employed to consistently estimate the parameters in Equation (4). 
Recent Monte-Carlo studies document that, in the context of dynamic spatial panel model, system-
GMM is the method of choice in terms of bias, root mean squared error, and standard error 
accuracy (Kukenova and Monteiro, 2009; Jacobs et al. 2009).  Jacobs et al. (2009) also 
demonstrates that the combination of collapsing the instrument matrix and limiting the lag depth of 
the dynamic instruments substantially reduces the bias in estimating the spatial lag parameter, but 
hardly affects its root mean squared error. We follow the recommendations of this line of literature 
in adopting the spatial system-GMM estimator and judiciously choosing the instruments. The setup 
of moment conditions follows Kelejian and Prucha (1999), i.e., both space-time lagged dependent 
variable and space lagged independent variables are included in the instrument list on top of the 
conventional instruments suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports system-GMM estimation results of the spatiotemporal autoregressive panel model 
in (4) and a conventional dynamic panel model without spatial interaction effects. Both time and 
spatial autocorrelation coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting fairly strong time and 
spatial self-reinforcing effects of total factor productivity for domestic private firms at county level, 
suggesting significant spillovers among local firms resulting from Marshallian agglomeration in 
space and over time. Estimated coefficients for own-regional (intra-regional) FDI presence are in 
most cases negative and significant, indicating negative immediate impact from FDI to domestic 
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firms located in the same county. Note that, however, these two benchmark regressions should be 
interpreted differently. For the spatiotemporal model, the partial derivative of TFP with respect to a 
change in FDI presence not only measures the direct impact (as captured by 2  and 3  in (4)) of 
this change on the own region but also measures its indirect impact (as captured by 2  and 3  in (4), 
the result of the feedback loops from the own region to neighboring regions and then back to the 
own region). Consequently, the difference in the magnitude of coefficients is due to the fact that 
conventional regression without spatial interactions is unable to capture these feedback effects and 
thus provides potentially biased estimates.  
 
The presence of SOEs, as captured by 
1  and 1 , seems to generate negative impacts on domestic 
firms. This is consistent with the results documented in the literature. SOEs tend to generate 
crowding out effect as well as distortions in both input and output markets. Note that the inter-
regional impact of SOEs presence, as captured by 
1 , is small in magnitude and not significant. 
This could be due to the fact that SOEs in China tend to focus on local regional markets for well-
documented cellular structure and localism; consequently, private firms are less affected by SOEs 
from neighboring regions.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In what follows we describe how spatial direct and indirect impacts, as well as a set of partitioning 
summary measures, can be generated from the estimated spatiotemporal model and how they can be 
used to describe the extent of FDI spillovers across space and over time. To account for spatial 
feedback effects and draw inference from long-term equilibrium perspective, we report summary 
measures of direct, indirect and total impacts as well as spatial partitioning of these impacts. To 
draw reliable statistical inference from the sampling theory perspective on these impacts is not a 
straightforward task as they are complicated, non-smooth functions of underlying model parameters 
as stated in (11) and (12). On the other hand, a simulation-oriented Bayesian approach would have 
been relatively straightforward if the posterior distribution of the underlying parameters were easy 
to sample from. We apply the asymptotic theory in Kwan (1999) to interpret the asymptotic normal 
distribution of the GMM estimator as an approximate posterior distribution, which in turn allows us 
to use simulation method to compute the posterior distribution of various impact measures and their 
spatial partitioning. More specifically, a random draw from the approximate posterior distribution 
of the parameter vector ( , , , )      is ˆd P    , where ˆ  is the value of the GMM estimate; 
P is the lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the GMM 
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estimator; and   is a vector containing random draws from a standard normal distribution. Each 
draw will result in one parameter combination for calculating impacts based on equations (8), (9) 
and (10). Based on 5000 random draws, we can then compute very accurate estimate of the 
moments and percentiles of the posterior distribution of the impacts.  
 
Table 3 reports the marginal posterior distributions of direct, indirect and total impacts for the two 
proxies of FDI penetration. Both posterior means of direct impact for FDI employment share and 
sales income share are negative, suggesting FDI presence in a specific county is likely to generate 
negative impacts on domestic private firms in the same county through taking over market share 
and better employees from local firms. The negative impact from market stealing may pass through 
neighboring counties, as suggested by the negative indirect spillovers captured by FDI sales income 
share. The knowledge spillovers through labor turnover, however, generate positive and significant 
inter-regional spillovers. The inter-regional spillovers outweigh the intra-regional spillovers in 
magnitude, resulting in positive average total FDI spillovers through labor market in the long-
term.
12
  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 reports statistics for spatially partitioned impacts based on 5,000 simulations. As discussed 
in previous section, these summary partitioned measures not only describe the decay pattern of 
spillovers but also decompose them into narrow and wide geographic scopes. The results indicate 
that, for both of the two FDI proxies we adopted in this study, the intra-regional (direct) spillovers 
and inter-regional (indirect) spillovers present very different spatial decay pattern. On average, the 
intra-regional spillovers become almost negligible even in first-order feedback loop (impact from 
immediate neighbors with W
1
 being the weight). Notice that the magnitudes of first-order feedback 
in both cases are very small, implying that the penetration of FDI in a specific county on average 
will affect its immediate neighbors, which in return will generate some but almost negligible 
feedback impacts to the domestic private firms in this specific county. The magnitudes of inter-
                                                        
12
 More precisely, assume that FDI employment share in all counties increases by 10% of the sample mean (i.e., 
0.111×10% = 0.011, see summary statistics in Appendix D), domestic private firms’ TFP on average would decrease 
by 0.844% (-0.768×0.011×100) due to direct impact from this increase in FDI presence in the exact same county 
they are located. Domestic private firms’ TFP on average would increase by 27.917% (25.379×0.011×100) due to 
indirect spillovers from the increase in FDI presence in their neighboring counties, after accounting for impacts from 
spatial feedback loops. Indirect spillovers outweigh the direct spillovers, leading to an overall increase of 27.072% 
(24.611×0.011×100) in TFP. On the other hand, if FDI sales income share in all counties increases by 10% of the 
sample mean (i.e., 0.127×10% = 0.013), the associated direct spillovers among to a 4.445% decrease in TFP and an 
even larger decrease of 53.468% due to indirect spillovers. The total spillovers in this case amount to 57.912% 
decrease in TFP of domestic private firms. 
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regional spillovers, however, are still quantitatively significant in the third-order feedback loop and 
could even extend to the fourth-order feedback loop. These results suggest that, among spatial 
feedback loops, the negative intra-regional FDI spillovers decay very fast and are almost bounded 
locally while the inter-regional FDI spillovers present slower decay pattern and could extend to 
higher order neighbors.  
 
As spatially partitioned impacts decompose impacts into narrow and wide geographic scopes, the 
results in Table 4 also filter and identify spillovers that pass through these scopes and reach 
domestic firms in different manners. As discussed in previous section, spillovers through labor 
turnover channel could be both negative (poaching local talents) and positive (knowledge spillover) 
that are operative at the same time. Knowledge spillovers, nevertheless, should have wider 
geographic scope than poaching effect. The results in Table 4 seem to have disentangled these two 
impacts successfully. The negative impacts in narrow scope (direct spillovers) are due to poaching 
whereas the positive knowledge spillovers become dominant in wider scope (indirect spillovers). 
Negative market stealing effect as captured by sales income share is negative in both narrow and 
wide scopes, which is consistent with our conjecture that such spillover has no boundary in a 
rapidly integrated market. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In Table 5, we present the posterior probabilities of spillovers for both FDI employment share and 
FDI sales income share based on simulated data. This table describes the most likely outcome when 
various spillover channels operate at the same time. In each 2 by 2 table, based on 5,000 
simulations, we calculate the probabilities of positive or negative spillovers for both direct and 
indirect impacts. The statistics reveal that the probabilities are not evenly distributed in all four 
scenarios. As for FDI employment share (Panel A), the probability for positive indirect and 
negative direct impacts is the highest (0.7292). This suggests that, through poaching or cherry 
picking local employees, MNEs generate locally bounded negative effect on the productivity 
performance of domestic firms located in the same county. Domestic firms located in neighboring 
counties, on the other hand, are likely to benefit from FDI knowledge spillovers which diffuse 
beyond borders. As for FDI sales income share (Panel B), the probability for both negative direct 
and indirect impacts outcome is the highest (0.9886) among all four scenarios, suggesting a 
sweeping market stealing effect that adversely affects domestic firms irrespective of geographical 
distance.  
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Figure 4 depicts density-distribution sunflower plots. With the aid of these plots we are able to 
display density of bivariate data (direct and indirect impacts) in a two dimensional graph. As 
presented in the figure, for FDI employment share, high- and medium-density regions are mainly 
located in the quadrant of negative direct spillovers and positive indirect spillovers. For FDI sales 
income share, high- and medium-density regions are mainly located in the quadrant where both 
direct and indirect spillovers are negative. These results are consistent with the posterior 
probabilities presented in Table 5. An additional interesting finding is that, as shown by the fitted 
line, for both FDI employment share and sales income share, direct and indirect spillovers are 
significantly and negatively correlated; with slope coefficients are -0.0165 and -0.0080 respectively. 
These negative correlations, as well as the fact that the one for FDI employment share is much 
stronger (more than doubled compared to FDI sales income share), remain puzzling to us and 
warrant further investigation in future research. 
 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 4 here] 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The diffusion and materialization of FDI spillovers are neither automatic nor universal; instead, 
they are affected by various simultanuously operating factors drawn from both economic and 
geographical dimensions. These factors are of different geographic scopes and reach domestic firms 
in different manners. How to identify and then quantify these resulting impacts separately remain a 
challenging yet important issue in the literature. We investigate in this paper the geographic extent 
of various FDI spillover channels and their diffusion pattern by means of a large panel data set of 
Chinese manufacturing firms and their location information down to county level. In particular, 
geographical distance is used to disentangle spillovers with different scopes from a complex overall 
effect with spatial feedback loops. Working with a spatiotemporal panel regression model, we are 
able to identify and uncover the sign, the magnitude, and the geographic attenuation pattern of FDI 
spillover effects from different channels.  
 
We find that intra-regional spillovers tend to be negative, irrespective of spillover channels. Inter-
regional spillovers, on the other hand, could be negative or positive depending on spillover 
channels. These findings are consistent with common belief about the sign and the scope of FDI 
spillovers. Given that it is relatively costly to poaching local talents from distant domestic firms 
whereas barries and communication cost for knowledge spillovers have been significantly reducing, 
our method identifies negative poaching impact in narrow scope and positive knowledge spillovers 
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in wider geographical scope. Our result also documents that negative market stealing effect does not 
have boundary and could extend from narrow scope to wide scope via rapidly integrated market.  
 
What is the policy take-away of this paper? In order to attract FDI and, most importantly, to 
facilitate domestic firms to learn from nearby foreign firms with advanced technology, China’s 
government has been providing incentive package for MNCs, as well as adopting place-based 
policy since the early 1990s. Corresponding strategies include tax holiday or reduction, job-creation 
subsidies, preferential loan to FDI, special economic zones and similar schemes, and construction 
of industrial facilities (land and infrastructure are subsidized) provided by both central and local 
governments. Many local governments also compete with their neighboring governments in this 
regard, which partially results in severe strategic tax competition and ‘race to the top / race to the 
bottom’ problem (Yao and Zhang, 2008). One major findings of this paper is that domestic firms 
mainly benefit from FDI presence in their neighboring regions, whereas FDI direct impacts to a 
specific location itself are likely to be negative. Consequently, as far as a particular local 
government is of concern, it is important to rethink about the strategic tax competition approach for 
attracting FDI, as the benefit from doing so may not be as large as commonly believed. A better 
strategy for local governments is to cooperate with each other to provide better environment for 
both MNCs and domestic firms, such as providing better infrastructure for transportation across 
regions, lower regional tariff for capital and labor, and fair tax treatment for both MNCs and 
domestic firms. To this end, coordination between local governments would be of utmost 
importance. 
 
In view of the fact that place-based FDI policy has been widely implemented in many developing 
countries in a top-to-bottom manner, the empirical evidence documented in this paper should not 
only be relevant to those who are interested in China’s FDI policy but also relevant for refining 
aggregate strategic response to FDI presence for developing countries in general. We also believe 
that incorporating industry dimension in a further study would be necessary.
13
 Given the salient 
economic agglomeration and industrial clustering phenomena at the regional level of China, sub-
industry evidence would provide vital focused reference for local governments to make their 
regional specific FDI policy. We leave it to future research to determine and demonstrate 
empirically these sub-industry results.   
                                                        
13
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer's insightful comment and suggestion on this point. 
  
17 
 
Appendix A: Ownership Structure and Their Corresponding Portions in NBS-CIE Database 
   Domestic Firms  Foreign Firms  
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures 
(JVs) 
 Others   
   Privates  SOEs               
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8): sum 
of (1) to 
(7) 
 (9) (10) 
(11): 
(9) + 
(10) 
 (12) (13) (14) 
(15):  
(12) + 
(13) + 
(14) 
 (16) (17) (18) 
(19): 
(16) + 
(17) + 
(18) 
 (20)   
Year 
No. of 
Firms 
 
Pure 
Privates 
Other 
Domestic 
Private 
Firms 
Collective 
Enterprise 
Joint-
Stock 
Enterprise 
Associated 
Economics 
Limited 
Liability 
Company 
Corporation 
Limited 
Enterprises 
All 
Domestic 
Privates 
 
Pure 
SOEs 
SOEs-
Domestic 
JVs 
SOEs  
Pure  
F-type 
FDI 
Pure 
HMT-
type FDI 
Joint 
Ventures 
between 
F and 
HMT 
FDI  
Sino-
Foreign 
JVs 
Sino-
HMT 
JVs 
Other 
Sino-
Foreign 
JVs 
Sino-
Foreign 
JVs 
 Undefined  
Total: 
(8) + 
(11) + 
(15) + 
(19) + 
(20) 
1998 102830  11.25 3.36 30.44 4.44 1.54 2.49 1.18 54.70  16.48 5.87 22.35  2.84 3.88 0.03 6.75  6.43 6.76 0.27 13.46  2.74  100 
1999 111715  13.17 4.53 27.44 4.48 1.43 3.17 1.39 55.60  14.80 5.96 20.76  3.13 4.97 0.04 8.14  5.89 6.60 0.25 12.75  2.76  100 
2000 110090  19.10 5.80 22.25 4.08 1.19 4.27 1.47 58.17  11.99 5.34 17.33  3.41 5.50 0.05 8.96  5.77 6.84 0.23 12.85  2.69  100 
2001 125235  26.56 7.86 16.84 3.66 0.95 5.57 1.52 62.96  8.97 4.32 13.29  3.83 5.82 0.05 9.70  5.44 6.19 0.22 11.85  2.21  100 
2002 136163  32.63 9.12 13.26 2.84 0.71 5.98 1.52 66.06  7.26 3.65 10.90  4.28 5.69 0.07 10.04  5.34 5.36 0.20 10.89  2.10  100 
2003 153585  37.94 10.95 9.38 2.22 0.52 6.46 1.47 68.95  5.30 2.70 8.00  4.72 6.35 0.05 11.12  5.01 4.89 0.16 10.06  1.88  100 
2004 219335  44.28 11.83 5.59 1.56 0.31 7.70 1.21 72.47  3.21 1.76 4.97  5.72 6.58 0.05 12.36  4.79 4.11 0.13 9.03  1.18  100 
2005 218401  44.93 13.76 4.47 1.28 0.26 7.44 1.19 73.34  2.44 1.37 3.81  5.97 6.88 0.05 12.91  4.41 3.68 0.10 8.19  1.76  100 
2006 239352  47.68 14.12 3.75 1.36 0.21 7.08 1.01 75.21  1.89 1.09 2.98  5.89 6.70 0.05 12.64  4.09 3.31 0.09 7.49  1.69  100 
2007 266311  48.43 16.27 2.96 1.14 0.17 6.90 0.92 76.78  1.42 0.86 2.28  5.92 6.55 0.05 12.52  3.67 2.91 0.09 6.67  1.75  100 
Notes: This table is produced based on total record of 503079 firms with 1683017 observations after we clearn up the dataset by following the suggestions provided in Brandt et al. (2012). All statistics reported are results after data 
cleaning. A firm’s ownership structure is determined by its source and structure of Paid in Capital and their registered type. ‘Pure’ means the Paid in Capital is 100% from the corresponding source; for instance, ‘Pure Private’ 
means all the Paid in Capital of these firms are from private sector. HMT denotes foreign firms from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. F denotes foreign firms from countries / regions other than Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database. 
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Appendix B: Data and Variable 
In this paper we employ data from the annual census of above-size manufacturing firms 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China (known as the Chinese Industrial 
Enterprises Database, NBS-CIE database henceforth) from 1998 to 2007. Our data cleaning process 
follows closely the suggestions provided in Brandt et al. (2012 and 2014). For this study, we drop 
firms with employment (personal engaged) below 8 workers and firms with negative nominal 
capital stocks, paid-up capital, sales revenue, value added, or intermediate inputs. We use industry 
concordances provided by Brandt et al. (2012) as consistent industry identifier throughout the 
sample period. Nominal input and output data are deflated by input and output deflators at 2-digit 
industry level (1998 = 100), which are also obtained from Brandt et al. (2012). 
Variables for capital stock in the original NBS-CIE database could not serve as good measures 
for capital input. Firms in the database do not report fixed investment. Fixed capital stock data are 
reported as the sum of book values in different years’ price level, which cannot be used directly for 
TFP estimation. We thus compute a real capital stock series using the perpetual inventory approach 
proposed in Brandt et al. (2012 and 2014).  
We first make use of the capital stock data reported in 1993 annual enterprise survey and in 1998 
NBS-CIE database to estimate average growth rate of the nominal capital stock between 1993 and 
1998 at province by industry (2-digit) level.
14
 By using this estimated growth rate ( g ), together 
with capital stock at original purchase price (
initialfa ) and the firm’s age ( age ), we calculate the 
firm’s initial nominal capital stock ( 0nk ) in the establishment year,  
nk
0
= fainitial (1+ g)
age
.
15
 The 
firm’s real capital stock in the establishment year (
 
rk
0
) is obtained by deflating 0nk  using 
investment deflator (1998 = 100) constructed by Perkins and Rawski (2008).
16
 Nominal capital 
stock data after the establishment year is then calculated by using the estimated growth rate ( g ). 
Assuming a 9% depreciation rate, the real capital stock data in 1998 (or the firm’s first year in the 
sample) is then calculated by using perpetual inventory method and Perkins and Rawski deflators.
17
 
Real capital stock after 1998 (or after the firm’s first year in the sample) is calculated by following 
                                                        
14
 The 1993 nominal capital stock data is made available in Brandt et al. (2012). As it is the earliest comparable data 
available, this paper, along with most other studies using NBS-CIE database, adopts 1993 as the initial year in 
applying the perpetual inventory method.  
15
 Following Brandt et al. (2012, 2014), we assume that, for firms with establishment year earlier than 1978, their 
experience before 1978 have negligible impact on the capital stock in 1998 and thus reset the establishment year for 
these firms to 1978. 
16
 Deflators up to 2006 are reported in Brandt et al. (2012). We thank Yifan Zhang for confirming our calculation of 
deflator for 2007 by following the chain-link approach in Perkins and Rawski (2008). 
17 The choice of 9% depreciation rate follows Perkins and Rawski (2008) and Brandt et al. (2012). This depreciation 
rate is used in most other studies for constructing capital stock using NBS-CIE database. 
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the same perpetual inventory method with 9% depreciation rate but use the first difference in firm’s 
nominal capital stock measured at original purchase prices as fixed investment for each year.  
 
Appendix C: Constructing County-level TFP from Firm-level Data 
County-level TFP in Eq. (4) is constructed as the weighted average of firm-level ln( )TFP s    
with the weights being the value added shares of the firm in the underlying county in each year. 
Specifically, itTFP , for county i , in year t  is constructed as 
 ln( )
jit
it jit
jitj i
va
TFP TFP
va



  
where 
jitva  denotes the year t ’s value added for firm j  located in county i .  
Our estimation procedure for firm-level productivity in logarithm, ln( )TFP , largely follows the 
algorithm initiated by Olley and Pakes (1996) and then further developed by Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) with the aim to tackle the potential endogeneity problem arising from potential correlation 
between input levels and unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks. This algorithm is 
commonly referred as “proxy variable approach” in the literature (Amit et al., 2008). We 
nevertheless do go beyond this conventional approach to incorporate some new developments in the 
literature, which are mainly drawn from Ackerberg et al. (2006), Melitz and Levinsohn (2006) and 
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Given that Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP hereafter) 
algorithm has become a standard method in the literature and has been reintroduced in many studies, 
in the following we should focus on discussing the places in our procedure that have departed from 
conventional LP routine.
18
  
The first departure from the conventional LP routine is in the functional form used for 
production function. Instead of using Cobb-Douglas production function, we adopt a translog 
production function that includes all the (logged) inputs and their second order polynomial terms, 
i.e., (logged) inputs squared and interaction terms between all (logged) inputs. This departure 
avoids the assumptions of 1) perfect substitution between production factors; 2) constant output 
elasticity across firms and over time; and 3) perfect competition in the production factors market 
across firms and over time, which are all too restrictive to be valid in the empirical application (De 
Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). More specifically, in a specific industry, for a value added translog 
production function we have 
                                                        
18
 For more comprehensive discussion on both theoretical and empirical issues of this topic, the interested reader is 
referred to Ackerberg et al. (2006), Melitz and Levinsohn (2006), Van Beveren (2012), and De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012). 
  
20 
2 2
jt l jt k jt ll jt kk jt lk jt jt jt jtva l k l k l k              
where 
jtva , jtl , jtk , and jt  are respectively firm j ’s value added, labor input, capital input, and 
unobserved productivity component at time t . All variables are in logarithm. 
jt  is an error term 
that is assumed to be uncorrelated with all input choices. Firms will make input decisions based on 
their productivity; thus, productivity component jt  is correlated to input choices. Since data for 
jt  usually is not available, conventional method like OLS will lead to bias estimation, unless a 
valid proxy for productivity could be included in the regression as control variable. 
To proxy for productivity, we follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to rely on material demand 
function, which assumes that demand for the intermediate input, 
 
m
jt
, is a monotonous (increasing) 
function of jt , i.e., ( , )jt t jt jtm m k  , where both jtk  and jt  are state variables based on which 
firms make their input decisions. The productivity component, jt , is then constructed by inverting 
this demand function to get ( , )jt t jt jth m k  .
19
 
As the second departure from the conventional LP method, we explore and include additional 
state variables and other demand conditions in (.)th . This departure follows Melitz and Levinsohn 
(2006) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) with an aim to incorporate more variables that 
potentially affect firms’ optimal input demand choice. Failing to do so would weaken the validity of 
using intermediate inputs as a proxy for productivity. Consequently, we include in (.)th  a vector jtz , 
i.e., ( , , )jt t jt jt jth m k z  , where jtz  includes a dummy for export status (equals 1 if export value is 
positive), a dummy for R&D status (equals 1 if R&D expenditure is positive), a survival propensity 
score described in Olley and Pakes (1996), and a demand condition derived in Melitz and 
Levinsohn (2006) to allow for product heterogeneity and imperfect competition.
20
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 Included in (.)th  are 
2 2, , ,  and jt jt jt jt jt jtm m k m k m . 
20
 NBS-CIE database, like many other firm level datasets, does not report either physical output or physical attributes 
for this output. A common solution is to use industry-level input and output deflators to deflate nominal terms. If 
firms in an industry produce homogeneous goods, an assumption that is implicitly assumed in the conventional LP 
routine, the above approach could yield a valid proxy for the unobserved physical output. However, since firms are 
likely to produce goods that are differentiated, firm level prices will fluctuate relative to the industry price index and 
hence break the link between deflated sales and physical output. Both Van Beveren (2012) and De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) illustrate the potential bias in the process of production function estimation, and thus in 
productivity, if this problem is not addressed appropriately. Under some modest assumptions, Melitz and Levinsohn 
(2006) show that including a demand condition,  (where, everything in logarithm, , is total 
industry deflated sales and tn  is the number of firms in the industry) in a conventional deflated production function 
is sufficient enough to eliminate the impact of unobserved firm level prices. 
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The final departure from LP routine is that, instead of identifying labor coefficient in a first stage, 
we identify all the coefficients at once and in the final stage. Ackerberg et al. (2006) illustrate that 
identifying labor coefficient in the first stage of LP routine is not possible. Given the assumption 
that decision on labor and intermediate inputs are both made based on state variables 
jtk  and jt , it 
is impossible to simultaneously identify both a non-parametric function of 
jtk  and jt  and the 
labor coefficient together since labor input is also a function of 
jtk  and jt . 
To be precise, in a first stage regression, we run 
( , , , )jt t jt jt jt jt jtva l k m z    
from where we obtain estimates of expected output, ˆ
jt , a proxy of productivity, , and an 
estimated for 
jt . The expected output is given by  
 
and the proxy of productivity is computed as 
 
where  is a vector of coefficients from the first stage regression.   
Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we rely on the law of motion for productivity, i.e., 
1 1( , )jt t jt jt jtz      , to identify all the coefficients in the second stage. By non-parametrically 
regressing  on  and 
1jtz  , we obtain the innovation to productivity, . The 
following moment conditions are then used to estimate coefficients in the production function  
 . 
Based on the estimated coefficients in this second stage, ˆ , firm-level ln( )TFP s  are computed as 
2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln( ) jt jt l jt k jt ll jt kk jt lk jt jtTFP va l k l k l k          . 
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Appendix D: Summary Statistics at County Level 
     Percentile           
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Obs. 
TFP of Domestic Private Firms 2.6384 2.3566 0.1994 1.1455 2.2469 3.6115 6.3601 17187 
FDI Presence: Employment Share 0.1112 0.1727 0 0 0.0320 0.1530 0.4968 18167 
FDI Presence: Sales Income Share 0.1270 0.1987 0 0 0.0298 0.1726 0.5898 18167 
SOEs Presence 0.3467 0.3300 0 0.0380 0.2464 0.6127 0.9876 18165 
W * TFP of Domestic Private Firms 1.4648 0.6266 0.5139 0.9587 1.4327 1.9491 2.5028 18167 
Space-time lagged TFP of Domestic Private Firms 1.3452 0.5966 0.4645 0.8608 1.2937 1.8077 2.3388 15519 
W * FDI Presence: Employment Share 0.0664 0.0281 0.0229 0.0446 0.0650 0.0862 0.1133 18167 
W * FDI Presence: Sales Income Share 0.0757 0.0299 0.0272 0.0531 0.0755 0.0997 0.1209 18167 
W * SOEs Presence 0.1941 0.1010 0.0647 0.1129 0.1626 0.2699 0.3819 18165 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database. 
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Figure 1: FDI Spatial Density Distribution at County Level 
FDI Density (Fixed Asset Share) at County Level (1998) 
 
FDI Density (Fixed Asset Share) at County Level (2007) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database. FDI density is measured by fixed asset share of FDI in each county, i.e., 
the value of fixed asset of foreign firms divided by the total fixed asset in a county. The color code on the map indicates the classes 
of density in quartiles, with the darkest color corresponding to the class of the highest density. 
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Figure 2: Moran Scatterplot of County-Level TFP in 1998, 2003, and 2007 
 
Notes: County level TFPs are constructed as the weighted average of firm-level ln(TFP)s with the weight being the value added share of each firm in the underlying county. All statistics are calculated 
based on row-standardized spatial weights matrix with 10 nearest neighbors. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database.  
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Figure 3: Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA) Cluster Map of Domestic Private Firms 
 
 
Note: LISA = Local Indicator of Spatial Association. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database.  
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Figure 4: Joint Posterior Distribution of Direct/Indirect Cumulative Spillovers 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on simulated data. 
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Table 1: Global Moran’s I for County-Level TFP  
of Domestic Private Firms 
 Moran’s I 
Standard 
Deviation 
p-value 
10 nearest neighbors    
TFP in 1998 0.0452 0.0106 < 0.001 
TFP in 2003 0.0817 0.0097 < 0.001 
TFP in 2007 0.1477 0.0102 < 0.001 
    
5 nearest neighbors    
TFP in 1998 0.0582 0.0141 < 0.001 
TFP in 2003 0.0910 0.0120 < 0.001 
TFP in 2007 0.1557 0.0122 < 0.001 
Notes: All statistics are calculated based on row-standardized spatial weights 
matrix with 5 or 10 nearest neighbors have non-zero spatial weight wij. County 
level TFPs are constructed as the weighted average of firm-level TFPs with the 
weights being the value added shares of each firm in the underlying county. 
Statistics for other years show the same upward pattern with minor fluctuations. 
To conserve space, only the statistics for the first, the middle, and the last year 
are reported.     
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NBS-CIE database. 
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Table 2: Benchmark Regression 
Dependent variable: TFP No spatial effects Spatiotemporal model 
Time lagged TFP 0.259 0.307 
 (0.046) (0.044) 
SOE presence -3.667 -3.704 
 (0.482) (0.511) 
FDI presence: employment share -1.459 -0.540 
 (0.675) (0.811) 
FDI presence: sales income share -1.468 -2.353 
 (0.672) (0.650) 
Space-time lagged TFP  0.305 
  (0.152) 
Spatially lagged SOE presence  -0.677 
  (1.354) 
Spatially lagged FDI presence: employment share  21.006 
  (12.311) 
Spatially lagged FDI presence: sales income share  -32.423 
  (12.464) 
Hansen Statistic 3.433 11.121 
Hansen Statistic P-value 0.842 0.744 
D.O.F of Hansen Statistic 7 15 
Number of Instruments 20 32 
N 14560 14560 
Notes: Results reported are two-step system-GMM estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. Windmeijer’s 
(2005) correction method for the two-step standard errors is employed. Year dummies are included in all 
regressions. Collapsed instrument matrix technique is employed to reduce the instrument count. 
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Table 3: Marginal Posterior Distributions of Cumulative Spillovers 
      Percentile 
  mean sd 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
FDI: employment share        
Direct spillovers -0.768 1.153 -2.649 -1.562 -0.774 -0.021 1.144 
Indirect spillovers 25.379 15.875 1.300 14.596 24.362 34.747 52.458 
Total spillovers 24.611 15.648 1.089 13.841 23.601 33.796 51.268 
FDI: sales income share        
Direct spillovers -3.419 0.949 -4.982 -4.063 -3.432 -2.783 -1.849 
Indirect spillovers -41.129 18.909 -75.784 -51.474 -39.426 -27.895 -14.556 
Total spillovers -44.548 18.773 -78.448 -54.815 -42.654 -31.242 -18.124 
Notes: All statistics reported are results from 5,000 simulations. 
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Table 4: Marginal Posterior Distributions of Partitioned Spillovers 
    
FDI presence: 
employment share 
FDI presence: 
sales income share 
    mean sd mean sd 
Direct spillovers    zero-order feedback loop (W0) -0.7677 1.1595 -3.4032 0.9508 
 first-order feedback loop (W1) 0.0082 0.0069 -0.0130 0.0092 
 second-order feedback loop (W2) 0.0012 0.0015 -0.0025 0.0026 
 third-order feedback loop (W3) 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0012 
  fourth-order feedback loop (W4) 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0010 
Indirect spillovers    zero-order feedback loop (W0) 18.1183 10.5059 -27.9471 10.5900 
 first-order feedback loop (W1) 4.9941 4.2375 -9.0740 6.1350 
 second-order feedback loop (W2) 1.8321 2.2087 -3.3481 3.5139 
 third-order feedback loop (W3) 0.5282 1.1982 -0.9770 2.0348 
  fourth-order feedback loop (W4) 0.1625 1.0769 -0.3070 1.9256 
Total spillovers    zero-order feedback loop (W0) 17.3505 10.1066 -31.3503 10.4028 
 first-order feedback loop (W1) 5.0023 4.2444 -9.0870 6.1442 
 second-order feedback loop (W2) 1.8332 2.2102 -3.3506 3.5165 
 third-order feedback loop (W3) 0.5285 1.1989 -0.9776 2.0360 
  fourth-order feedback loop (W4) 0.1626 1.0775 -0.3072 1.9267 
Notes: All statistics reported are results from 5,000 simulations. 
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Table 5: Posterior Probabilities 
Panel A: FDI Presence: Employment Share      
  Indirect spillovers 
          Negative Positive 
Direct spillovers 
Positive 0.0216 0.2302 
Negative 0.0190 0.7292 
Panel B: FDI Presence: Sales Income Share      
         
 
Indirect spillovers 
  Negative Positive 
Direct spillovers 
Positive 0 0.0078 
Negative 0.9886 0.0036 
Notes: All statistics reported are results from 5,000 simulations. 
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